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For over 100 years, lack of memory in murder cases has 
been a common and frequent defense. Although the 
expressions differ, they all amount to the same thing. 
Cases abound with commonly used statements or 
testimony by a person accused of or convicted of murder 
that “I don’t remember anything”; “my mind went blank”; 
“I blacked out”; “I panicked and don’t remember what I 
did or anything that happened.” While the terminology of 
defendant’s state of mind and alleged lack of memory is 
different in this case from the expressions often used by 
persons accused of crime to prove their lack of memory, it 
has never hitherto been sustained by any Court, although 
similar language . . . [has] been used for more than a 
 
       †      J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., University 
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century.1 
 
[L]imited amnesia does not totally incapacitate the 
defense and the defendant is free to assist counsel in 
numerous ways. We believe that a defendant is entitled to 
a fair trial, but not necessarily to a perfect trial.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many criminal defendants in the United States claim total or 
partial amnesia for the events surrounding their alleged crimes.  
While the exact percentages vary based on the type of crime and 
the circumstances surrounding the arrest, in general the numbers 
are surprisingly high—almost a third of accused violent criminals 
and nearly half of accused murderers claim some form of amnesia.3  
Yet despite the large number of such claims, American courts have 
never “found a defendant incompetent to stand trial solely because 
of amnesia.”4 
The reasons are manifold, including the fact that “[a]mnesia is 
difficult to assess and even when it is considered genuine, a court 
may rule that it does not necessarily affect a defendant’s 
competency to stand trial.”5  Nevertheless, the judicial reluctance to 
find admittedly amnesic defendants incompetent seems anomalous 
for a serious psychological problem that, at least on a theoretical 
level, deeply implicates a criminal defendant’s right to consult with 
counsel, his right to a fair trial, and his overall competence to stand 
trial. 
This Note first examines the ways in which amnesia might 
render a defendant incompetent to stand trial, based on the 
research and commentary of legal and scientific scholars.6  It then 
reviews and critiques some of the many rationales (both theoretical 
and practical) that courts employ in finding amnesic defendants 
 
 1. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 218 A.2d 758, 760 (Pa. 1966). 
 2. State v. McClendon, 437 P.2d 421, 425 (Ariz. 1968). 
 3. Maaike Cima et al., I Can’t Remember Your Honor: Offenders Who Claim 
Amnesia, 5 GERMAN J. PSYCHIATRY 24, 25 (2002). 
 4. S.D. Parwatikar et al., The Detection of Malingered Amnesia in Accused 
Murderers, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 97, 102 (1985). 
 5. Ronald Roesch & Stephen L. Golding, Amnesia and Competency to Stand 
Trial: A Review of Legal and Clinical Issues, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 87, 87 (1986) . 
 6. See infra Parts II-III. 
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competent to stand trial.7  Next, this Note argues that many of the 
theoretical problems are groundless or misconceived, and that 
judicial pragmatism accounts for much of the courts’ reluctance to 
consider amnesia relevant.8  Then, after reviewing some of the 
better techniques for detecting malingering and discussing a new 
way to view claims of accused amnesics, this Note proposes a 
functional, modest way to deal with amnesia claims.9  This 
functional approach is inspired by new developments in psychiatry 
and an evolving conception of the theoretical rationale for 
protecting incompetent criminal defendants.  Along with basic 
notions of fairness, these factors command that courts employ a 
greater sensitivity to this surprisingly ubiquitous dilemma.10 
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: AMNESIA AND CRIMINAL LAW 
Amnesia is a complex and variegated mental disorder.  A basic 
clinical definition is that amnesia is “a behavioral syndrome marked 
by a severe inability to acquire and retain new permanent 
memories (anterograde amnesia), often coupled with some degree 
of impairment in the retrieval of previously acquired memories 
(retrograde amnesia).”11 Amnesia claims generally fall into one of 
three different categories: dissociative amnesia, organic amnesia, or 
feigned (i.e., malingered) amnesia. 
Briefly, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) defines 
the essential feature of dissociative amnesia (also referred to as 
“psychogenic” or “functional” amnesia) as “an inability to recall 
important personal information, usually of a traumatic or stressful 
nature, that is too extensive to be explained by normal 
forgetfulness.”12  This type of amnesia is said to arise from an event 
that is so traumatic, or from a period of such high arousal, that the 
defendant loses or fails to form any memory of the event in 
question.13  But because “eyewitnesses of extreme violence seldom 
develop amnesia for the events they witnessed,” the theory that 
 
 7. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 8. See infra Part VI. 
 9. See infra Parts VII-IX. 
 10. See infra Part IX. 
 11. Elizabeth W. Rubinsky & Jason Brandt, Amnesia and Criminal Law: A 
Clinical Overview, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 27, 33 (1986). 
 12. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 520 (4th ed. text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 13. See id. 
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strong emotions lead to amnesia “is very controversial, and, 
therefore, it is wise to consider dissociative amnesia as a rare 
phenomenon.”14 
In contrast, the APA defines amnestic disorder (more 
commonly known as “organic amnesia”) as “characterized by a 
disturbance in memory that is either due to the direct physiological 
effects of a general medical condition or due to the persisting 
effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication, or toxin 
exposure).”15  This type of amnesia is said to arise from a physical 
defect that “may be structural (e.g., epilepsy, brain trauma), but it 
may also be momentary such as in the case of alcohol or drug 
intoxication.”16  Many cases of claimed amnesia in the criminal 
context are presumably organic—for example, in the case of a 
defendant who is extremely intoxicated at the time of the crime, or 
who suffers severe brain trauma as a result of a car crash or gunshot 
wound. 
Finally, criminal defendants likely feign (or “malinger”) 
amnesia for a number of reasons, including as “an attempt to 
obstruct police investigation and/or to avoid responsibility for their 
acts.”17  Many offenders may also feign amnesia because of the 
apparently strong perception among the public that complete 
amnesia is a common and plausible reaction to a traumatic event, 
especially when alcohol or drugs are involved.18  The number of 
 
 14. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 27. 
 15.   See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 12, at 172. 
 16. Cima et al.,  supra note 3, at 25;  see also Sven-Ake Christianson & Susanna 
Bylin, Does Simulating Amnesia Mediate Genuine Forgetting for a Crime Event?, 13 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 495, 496 (1999) (noting the correlation between 
genuine amnesia and crimes committed under emotional stress in combination 
with drug or alcohol abuse).  This correlation may lead to a large number of 
suspects attributing their amnesia to these factors.  See Parwatikar et al., supra note 
4, at 97 (“A significant number of murderers referred for pretrial psychiatric 
examination claim amnesia and attribute it either to alcohol, drug abuse, or an 
emotional difficulty in recalling the alleged crime.”). 
 17. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 26;  see also Christianson & Bylin, supra note 
16, at 495 (suggesting that, save for cases of genuine amnesia, the suspect 
ultimately is trying to avoid conviction by avoiding answering questions based on a 
claim of poor memory); Richard Rogers & J.L. Cavanaugh, Nothing But the Truth . . 
. : A Re-examination of Malingering, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 446 (1983) (arguing 
that offenders simulate amnesia out of a combination of “coping strategies, good 
judgment, and survival”). 
 18. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 24-25.  The authors describe a simulation 
study in which more than 70% of those studied found “highly plausible” an expert 
witness’s testimony about an offender who developed complete amnesia for a 
crime involving drugs and high emotions.  They note that “[a]pparently, offenders 
4
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offenders who feign an amnesia claim is unknown, but is presumed 
to be at least 20% of all claimed cases,19 and it may be much 
higher.20  In the view of some researchers, “malingered amnesia is a 
most common cause for perpetrators’ failure to ‘remember’ the 
crime incident.”21 
Because of the high incidence of malingering, genuine 
amnesia is presumably quite rare.22  Nevertheless, the number of 
criminal defendants who claim some form of amnesia for their 
criminal acts is simply too high to ignore.  This is particularly true 
of violent crimes because researchers have found that “evidence 
that the incidence of claimed amnesia is higher when the charges 
are more serious, such as homicide.”23  One group of researchers 
found that “[a]s a rule of thumb, 20 to 30% of offenders of violent 
crimes claim amnesia for their crime.”24  Indeed, the number of 
accused murderers who claim amnesia has been particularly well 
studied: it has “been reported to be anywhere from 10 to 70 
percent,”25 although most likely near the higher end of that 
spectrum.26  And while most of the literature is focused on amnesia 
claims in murder or manslaughter cases, “there are other crime 
 
who claim crime-related amnesia do not need to worry that their claim meets 
widespread disbelief,” and conclude that “the idea that strong emotions, alcohol 
and/or drugs may affect offenders in such way that they fully forget what they have 
done is apparently widespread.”  Id.  But see Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 93 
(“[T]he courts and society in general view a defendant’s claim of amnesia with 
great suspicion.”). 
 19. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 26. 
 20. See Maaike Cima et al., Claims of Crime-related Amnesia in Forensic Patients, 27 
INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 220 (2004) (noting also the higher incidence of 
claimed amnesia among suspects who have been arrested previously, and 
suggesting that “offenders who are familiar with the penal system have had more 
opportunities to experience the advantages of claiming (partial) amnesia for their 
crime”). 
 21. Christianson & Bylin, supra note 16, at 496 (citations omitted). 
 22. See Cima et al., supra note 3, at 26-32 (analyzing different causes and tests 
of amnesia and suggesting that experts use objective measures and multiple tests 
before amnesia diagnosis). 
 23. Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 93. 
 24. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 25. 
 25. Parwatikar et al., supra note 4, at 97. 
 26. One study revealed that 25-45% of criminals found guilty of homicide 
claim amnesia.  Cima et al., supra note 3, at 24.  Another two and one-half year 
study of thirty patients in a forensic psychiatry department ward who had 
committed homicide found that 60% claimed some form of amnesia, a number in 
line with the 40-70% they had found through a survey of the literature.  John McD. 
W. Bradford & Selwyn M. Smith, Amnesia and Homicide: The Padola Case and a Study 
of Thirty Cases, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 219, 228 (1979). 
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categories in which claims of amnesia do occur,”27 such as “sexual 
crime cases, domestic violence cases, and fraud cases.”28  Studies 
have indicated that age, low IQ, alcohol abuse, depressed mood, 
and hysterical traits are the factors most commonly correlated with 
criminal amnesia claimants.29 
III. AMNESIA AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL IN AMERICAN 
COURTS30 
In light of the large number of such cases, what effect, if any, 
does amnesia have on a defendant’s fitness to stand trial?  In Dusky 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in order to be judged 
competent to stand trial, a criminal defendant must have “sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”31  This 
requirement has been interpreted as having two distinct prongs: 
the “rational and factual understanding of proceedings” prong, 
and the “ability to consult with counsel” prong.32  Because it is a 
 
 27. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 25. 
 28. Id. (citations omitted).  Although these researchers assert that claims of 
amnesia “regularly occur” with other types of crimes, the vast majority of reported 
cases and literature deal with amnesia in the violent crime context, presumably 
because of the association of violent crime with intoxication, arousal, and an 
increased incidence of malingering.  See id.; see also Roesch & Golding, supra note 
5, at 93 (noting an additional motivation to feign amnesia when the death penalty 
is involved—a penalty reserved for particularly violent crimes). 
The various problems associated with malingering are discussed in Part VII.  See 
also Marko Jelicic et al., Symptom Validity Testing of Feigned Crime-Related Amnesia: A 
Simulation Study, 5 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (2004). 
 29. Cima et al., supra note 20, at 216. 
 30. Amnesia is also relevant to other aspects of criminal law besides 
competency to stand trial, such as in sentencing, mitigation, and, perhaps most 
importantly, to basic criminal responsibility.  The relationship between criminal 
responsibility and amnesia is properly outside the scope of the present article; 
briefly, however, competency to stand trial is a present inquiry focused on whether 
the criminal defendant is able to stand trial for a crime committed in the past.  In 
contrast, the question of criminal responsibility looks back to the defendant’s 
mental state at the time of the offense.  Thus, in cases of alleged automatism—
where the criminal defendant does not know what she is doing as a result of 
mental disease, defect, intoxication, or some other cause—a defendant’s claim of 
amnesia might be relevant to show that at the time of the crime, the defendant did 
not have the mental state required for that criminal conviction.  See, e.g., Rubinsky 
& Brandt, supra note 11, at 29-32. 
 31. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 32. See Kim Cocklin, Amnesia: The Forgotten Justification for Finding an Accused 
Incompetent to Stand Trial, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 289, 294-96 (1981).  Cocklin found that  
6
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constitutional holding, all courts follow the Dusky competence 
standard.33  Thus, when considering whether a particular defendant 
claiming amnesia is competent to stand trial, courts ought to 
examine whether the alleged amnesia interferes with the 
defendant’s capacity to understand the proceedings, or whether 
amnesia impairs his ability to consult with his attorney.  But as will 
be discussed, despite strong arguments to the contrary, courts 
usually do not consider amnesia an important factor in the 
competency determination. 
As a starting point, a close reading of the Dusky opinion itself 
suggests that memory of the events in question ought to be an 
important consideration in the competency determination.  First, 
the defendant in Dusky allegedly suffered from amnesia: he “denied 
all memory of events surrounding an alleged kidnapping with 
which he was charged.”34  However, this fact is of only limited 
relevance because he “did not rely on this point in bar of trial.”35 
Second, and more importantly, in articulating the competency 
standard, the Supreme Court in Dusky agreed that “it is not enough 
for the district judge to find that ‘the defendant [is] oriented to 
time and place and [has] some recollection of events.’”36  Some scholars 
have taken this statement to suggest “that memory of the offense is 
an additional element of the test,”37 such that “an assessment of the 
defendant’s ability to remember the time period of the alleged 
offense and describe it to his attorney is an important aspect of the 
fitness to stand trial determination.”38 
 
“Dusky altered the common-law test somewhat by emphasizing the defendant’s 
capability to consult with counsel and his ability to comprehend the proceedings.”  
Id. at 294. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Case Note, Capacity to Stand Trial: The Amnesic Criminal Defendant, 27 MD. 
L. REV. 182, 187 (1967). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 362 U.S. at 402 (quoting the Solicitor General) (emphasis added). 
 37. Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the 
Forensic Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 81 n.45 (1982). 
 38. Id. at 81.  At least two courts have taken memory into account as an 
element of the competency determination.  Id. at 81 n.46.  One court expected 
the defendant “to tell his lawyer the circumstances, to the best of his mental 
ability, (whether colored or not by mental aberration) the facts surrounding him 
at the time and place where the law violation is alleged to have been committed.”  
Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 322 (W.D. Mo. 1961).  Another court stated that 
one of the competency factors was “whether he has some recollection of the events 
involved in the crime . . . .”  People v. Angelillo, 432 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131 (Suffolk 
County Ct. 1980).  Despite these two cases, however, “[a] majority of courts also 
7
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However, American courts have not been receptive to this 
argument, and have instead taken a variety of unsympathetic 
approaches to the problem of the amnesic criminal defendant.  But 
before discussing the treatment of amnesia claims in court, this 
Note first examines the most persuasive arguments for why amnesia 
is relevant and should sometimes be considered a bar to a finding 
of competency. 
IV. THE CASE FOR AMNESIA AS A BAR TO COMPETENCY 
No American court has ever found amnesia alone as a bar to 
competency.39  This is true in spite of the persuasive arguments for 
why amnesia may compromise a criminal defendant’s fitness to 
stand trial.  As one commentator noted, 
[a]n examination of how amnesia and brain-injured cases 
are handled, in which the defendant can truly be said to 
fall short of the Dusky standard and yet in almost every 
case is indeed required to stand trial, reveals the utter 
absurdity of the law with respect to the competency issue.40 
The two most persuasive arguments for why amnesia should 
lead to a finding of incompetency have focused on the ability of the 
defendant to mount an effective defense.  The first argument 
focuses on the Dusky “ability to consult with counsel” prong, and 
the second argument insists that amnesia denies a defendant’s 
“right to a fair trial.”  This Note will consider each argument in 
turn. 
The first major argument for why amnesia should be 
considered relevant to competency is that it implicates a criminal 
defendant’s ability to “consult with counsel,” based on a broad 
reading of the second prong of the two-prong Dusky standard.  
Although some scholars argue that amnesia implicates the 
“understanding of the proceedings” prong of the Dusky standard as 
well,41 the majority of the better-reasoned academic articles focus 
 
hold . . . that amnesia for the time of the offense is not a bar to a finding of 
competency to stand trial.”  Slobogin, supra note 37, at 81 n.46. 
 39. See Parwatikar et al., supra note 4, at 102. 
 40. Abraham L. Halpern, Use and Misuse of Psychiatric Competency Examinations 
On Criminal Defendants, 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 123, 141 (1975). 
 41. See Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that a “complete lack of factual understanding of the period 
involved in the charges on trial” could result in a finding of incompetency); 
Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 29 (finding that courts have used amnesia as 
a factor in determining competency under the Dusky standard). 
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instead on the “consult with counsel” prong.42  The Dusky court 
required a criminal defendant to have “sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.”43  Despite a generally chilly reception by the 
courts,44 many scholars (and a handful of judges) have argued that 
temporary or permanent amnesia interferes with the right of a 
defendant to presently assist his counsel.45  The Dusky standard 
requires a sufficient present ability to consult with counsel.  Thus, 
the theory behind the argument for amnesia as a bar to 
competency was well articulated in the pre-Dusky case of United 
States v. Sermon, where the court argued that “[b]roadly speaking, 
one cannot properly assist in his own defense unless he can advise 
his counsel concerning the facts of the case as known to him and 
unless, if necessary, he can testify on his own behalf in the cause 
concerning those facts.”46  The court continued: 
Defendants do not assist in their own defense by telling 
their lawyers what motions to file or how a particular 
witness should be examined, or cross-examined . . . but to 
 
 42. Halpern, supra note 40, at 141.  Another scholar noted that 
[c]ourts have refused to recognize amnesia as a basis for declaring a 
defendant incompetent to stand trial.  The refusal to apply the Dusky 
standard to the accused suffering from amnesia causes a decidedly 
anomalous result.  Arguably, one who is amnesic is not able to assist in his 
defense under the Dusky standard.  Thus to declare the amnesic 
competent seems contrary to the rationale for the competency standard.  
Yet no reported case has held amnesia constitutes mental incompetency 
to stand trial. 
Cocklin, supra note 32, at 301 (footnotes omitted). 
 43. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 44. See infra Part V. 
 45. See, e.g., Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 88 (noting that clinicians 
could potentially find defendants incompetent to stand trial if the Dusky criteria 
were first examined); Robert D. Miller, People v. Palmer, Amnesia and Competency to 
Proceed Revisited, 31 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 177 (2003); see also Dennis Koson & 
Ames Robey, Amnesia and Competency to Stand Trial, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 588, 588 
(1973) (“The [amnesic], by virtue of his inability to recall his own whereabouts, 
the circumstances of the alleged crime, or other events leading up to it, at least 
theoretically renders himself unable to be of assistance to counsel in the 
preparation of his defense.  If the defendant can neither inform his lawyer of the 
actual circumstances nor recognize or challenge false or misleading evidence 
detrimental to his case, he should be found incompetent to stand trial.”). 
 46. United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 977 (D. Mo. 1964); see also 
Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 29 (“The presence of a severely deficient 
memory, at the time of the trial, for the events surrounding the commission of a 
crime would presumably put a defendant at a distinct disadvantage in assisting his 
counsel in the preparation of a defense.”). 
9
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such phases of a defense as a defendant usually assists in, 
such as accounts of the facts, names of witnesses, etc. . . . 
[and the] primary assistance that must be rendered 
counsel is a full revelation of the facts within the 
knowledge of the defendant in areas which are in 
legitimate dispute.47 
Thus, the argument for why amnesia renders a criminal 
defendant incompetent to stand trial is based on a broad reading 
of the Dusky “ability to consult with counsel” prong.  The amnesic 
defendant will necessarily fall short of having “sufficient present 
ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding”: although he may literally be able to 
consult with his counsel, he will not have a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding as a result of having no memory for the 
events in question. 
However, despite the broad language quoted above, the Sermon 
court ultimately found the defendant competent to stand trial after 
a review of all the circumstances.48  And this result is quite typical.  
As this Note will discuss, courts have generally taken a very narrow 
interpretation of the Dusky “ability to consult with counsel” prong, 
and have actually found most allegedly amnesic defendants 
competent to stand trial.49 
The second principal argument for why amnesia is relevant to 
competency is that the amnesic criminal defendant cannot secure a 
fair trial.  This second argument is conceptually similar to the first 
argument in that it also relates to whether a defendant can assist in 
his own defense, but it focuses more on fairness and the purpose of 
the competency inquiry, rather than relying strictly on Dusky.  The 
crux of this argument is that, by reasons of the criminal 
defendant’s inability to assist in his own defense, the trial of an 
amnesic criminal defendant is a denial of the constitutional right to 
a fair trial, a violation of due process, or some other constitutional 
affront.50  For example, one scholar argues that amnesia implicates 
 
 47. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957)). 
 48. Id. at 981-84. 
 49. See infra Part V; see also Parwatikar et al., supra note 4, at 102 (pointing out 
that no court has held a person incompetent based solely on amnesia, even where 
defendants could not assist in their defenses). 
 50. See Donald H. J. Hermann, Criminal Defenses and Pleas in Mitigation Based 
on Amnesia, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 23 (1986) (noting that when the issue is framed as 
one of guaranteeing a fair trial rather than ensuring that the defendant is 
10
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a defendant’s right to be present at trial and to testify on his own 
behalf if 
he is unable to recall the facts, events, and circumstances 
surrounding his alleged criminal act . . . .  His inability to 
testify to facts which may establish an effective alibi, or to 
offer evidence in excuse, justification, or extenuation 
would seem to bring the [amnesic] clearly within the very 
purpose of the competency rule.51 
This passage highlights one of the most important situations 
where amnesia could render a criminal defendant legally 
incompetent to stand trial: the possible existence of some 
extenuating circumstances or defense to the crime that the 
defendant cannot, as a result of his mental deficiency, employ in 
his own defense.  As scholars and courts note, the inability to 
effectively mount a vigorous defense goes to the very heart of the 
right to a fair trial.  One court reasoned nearly 100 years ago (in 
referring to the “language of the old books”) that memory is vital to 
competency “because there may be circumstances lying in his 
private knowledge which would prove him innocent or his legal 
irresponsibility, of which he can have no advantage, because they 
are not known to persons who undertake his defense.”52  Scholars 
 
competent, the tendency is for courts to defer trial until the defendant's memory 
returns); Comment, Criminal Law—Ability to Stand Trial—Amnesia, 52 IOWA L. REV. 
339, 341-42 (1966) (arguing that amnesia obfuscates the right to counsel by 
reducing the meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel to “a mere sham”). 
 51. Comment, supra note 50, at 341;  cf. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211(a)(2)(vi) 
(including defendant's capacity to testify relevantly as one of several factors to 
consider when determining fitness to stand trial).  But see United States v. Sullivan, 
406 F.2d 180, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1969): 
If in fact he had developed an amnesia preventing his recollection of the 
events of the day in question, this would not in itself be a complete 
defense to the charges.  There were other witnesses to the events who 
could and did testify . . . .  [The defendant] was capable of understanding 
the charges and assist [sic] in the conduct of the trial.  We cannot say 
that in these circumstances an amnesia for the events in question . . . 
must constitute a defense to criminal prosecution for acts committed in 
an apparently sober and competent interlude. 
 52. United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (S.D. Ala. 1906). The majority 
further suggested that a defendant would only be competent to stand trial if he 
has such possession and control of his mental powers, including the faculty 
of memory, as will enable him to testify intelligently and give his counsel all 
the material facts bearing upon the criminal act charged against him and 
material to repel the criminating evidence, and has such poise of his 
faculties as will enable him to rationally and properly exercise all the 
rights which the law gives him in contesting a conviction. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
11
Tysse: Note: The Right to an "Imperfect" Trial—Amnesia, Malingering, and
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
10TYSSE_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005   
364 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
have made a similar point: 
The [amnesic], by virtue of his inability to recall his own 
whereabouts, the circumstances of the alleged crime, or 
other events leading up to it, at least theoretically renders 
himself unable to be of assistance to counsel in the 
preparation of his defense.  If the defendant can neither 
inform his lawyer of the actual circumstances nor 
recognize or challenge false or misleading evidence 
detrimental to his case, should he be found incompetent 
to stand trial.53 
One group of researchers relate a true story that starkly 
demonstrates the potential pitfalls of failing to take a defendant’s 
claim of amnesia seriously.54  A defendant was charged with sexual 
assault and murder, but claimed patchy amnesia for the events in 
question.55  Only after several sessions with the psychologists was he 
able to recover portions of his memory and relate some of the 
details of his crime.56  These details ended up being of vital 
significance to his defense: they revealed that a sexual assault had 
not taken place, but that he had instead paid the victim for sex and 
murdered her after an argument in which the victim had tried to 
extort more money from him.57  The police later verified this 
account with the discovery of corroborating evidence.58  Had the 
defendant been unable to recall the events in question, he would 
have faced the death penalty; instead, the sexual assault charge was 
dropped, he pled guilty to second degree murder, and he avoided 
capital punishment.59  Thus, this information quite possibly saved 
his life.60  This situation, while presumably quite rare, accentuates 
the importance of memory for a criminal defendant, and shows 
why courts should consider amnesia as a possible obstacle to 
competency. 
V. AMNESIA AND THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF COMPETENCY 
Because American courts agree that all criminal defendants 
 
 53. Koson & Robey, supra note 45, at 588. 
 54. Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 95. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/2
10TYSSE_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005   
2005]  THE RIGHT TO AN “IMPERFECT” TRIAL 365 
are entitled to a fair trial and the right to consult with counsel, the 
issues posed by amnesia claims ultimately reveal how far courts are 
willing to go to protect the rights of potentially incompetent 
criminal defendants.  Read narrowly, the Dusky “ability to consult 
with counsel” prong is easily met—almost anyone who can actually 
speak or otherwise communicate will, literally, be able to “consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding . . . .”61  This literal reading places the bar so low 
that anyone who can actually discuss trial strategy and choose 
possible defenses is competent to stand trial.  Admittedly, then, for 
amnesia to interfere with a defendant’s ability to “consult with 
counsel” under Dusky, the competency standard would have to be 
read very broadly62—indeed, probably more broadly than Dusky has 
been read before,63 and certainly more broadly than it has ever 
been read in the amnesia context.64  The same is also true for the 
right to a fair trial: “A criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial, 
not a perfect trial,” as the courts are fond of saying in the amnesia 
context.65 
 
 61. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 62. As one scholar has noted, “the incompetence to stand trial criteria can, as 
a normative matter, be interpreted narrowly or broadly.” Stephen J. Morse, Why 
Amnesia and the Law is Not a Useful Topic, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 99, 99 (1986).  Morse 
argues that 
[under a narrow interpretation of the competency criteria,] a defendant 
who is able at the time of trial to understand the charges and to behave 
rationally will be found competent even if, for any number of reasons, he 
cannot reasonably reconstruct the circumstances of the alleged crime.  A 
broader interpretation would find such a defendant incompetent 
because it is surely arguable that a defendant who does not remember 
the crucial events has substantially impaired ability to assist his counsel in 
preparing an adequate defense. 
Id. at 99-100. 
 63. Cocklin, supra note 32, at 293 (noting that the typical, narrow 
interpretation of Dusky has led to the undesirable result that “[o]ne could be 
mentally defective, emotionally unstable, illiterate, or found to have ‘sociopathic 
personality’ disturbances and yet be competent to stand trial under the Dusky 
test”) (footnotes omitted). 
 64. See Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 92 (recognizing that despite 
circumstances where a defendant’s amnesia should arguably lead to a finding of 
incompetency, “[m]ost courts have used a strict interpretation of Dusky”); see also 
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 124 (2d ed. 1999). 
 65. McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1550 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Delaware 
v. Van Arsdall, 175 U.S. 673 (1986)).  See also State v. McClendon, 437 P.2d 421, 
425 (Ariz. 1968); People v. Amador, 246 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. 
Palmer, 31 P.3d 863, 870 (Colo. 2001).   
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But it seems that, at least in those (admittedly rare) cases 
where the prosecution acknowledges that the accused has 
absolutely no recollection of the events in question,66 logic would 
dictate that the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel would be 
quite restricted, at least regarding anything meaningful to his 
defense.  Therefore, if a defendant’s ability to consult with counsel 
and receive a fair trial are not to be completely empty rights, courts 
ought to take a more critical view of the purpose of the competency 
determination and the values it is designed to preserve. 
Although courts generally have been unwilling to read Dusky 
broadly or interpret the notion of competency to extend so far, this 
is not to say that courts have completely ignored the amnesia claims 
of defendants.67  The rare court, for example, has even suggested 
that memory is a vital competency component.68  However, such 
broad statements, even in dicta, have been made infrequently in 
recent years.69  Instead, modern courts have basically taken two 
approaches when considering amnesia’s relationship to the fitness 
to stand trial determination: while some courts hold “that amnesia 
can never be an adequate ground for determining that an accused 
is unfit to stand trial, [other] courts have determined that amnesia 
is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is 
unfit to stand trial or can receive a fair trial.”70 
The latter approach, that amnesia is a factor to be considered, 
has been followed in a few cases.  These cases have suggested that if 
the defendant were found to be a total amnesic in regard to the 
alleged criminal events he would be found incompetent,71 or at 
 
 66. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 67. See Hermann, supra note 50, at 21; Melton et al., supra note 64, at 124 
(remarking on the sensitivity courts have shown “to the threat amnesia poses to 
accurate adjudication” while noting that “courts have been unanimous in refusing 
to equate amnesia with incompetency”). 
 68. See, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (holding 
that a “sound memory” was a prerequisite to competency). 
 69. See Koson & Robey, supra note 45, at 588 (noting that while “[t]here is 
ample authority to the effect that competency to stand trial generally includes the 
faculty of memory,” courts have not consistently reasoned this way because then 
“any amnesic defendant would have to found incompetent . . . [and m]any have 
not been so adjudicated”). 
 70. See Hermann, supra note 50, at 21. 
 71. In United States v. Sermon, the majority implies that if the defendant were a 
total amnesic, he would be considered incompetent: “[C]ertainly no one in the 
1960’s would dream of putting a defendant suffering from established amnesia to 
trial for a crime of any sort.” 228 F. Supp. 972, 976 (D. Mo. 1964).  The majority 
also suggests that the “primary assistance that must be rendered counsel is a full 
14
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least that amnesia is an important factor to be considered when 
determining competency.72  These cases generally hold, often by 
relying on Dusky, that a defendant’s ability to recall the events in 
controversy should at least be considered at trial.73 
Perhaps the best known American decision on the relationship 
between amnesia and competency to stand trial, Wilson v. United 
States is an example of a comprehensive treatment of the “amnesia 
as a factor” approach.74  The defendant in Wilson robbed a bank 
and, after a high-speed chase with the police, severely injured 
himself in a violent crash.75  Upon waking from a lengthy coma, he 
claimed to have no knowledge of the period from several hours 
before the robbery to when he awoke three weeks later.76  Under 
these circumstances, the usually “hotly contested” claim—“that the 
appellant suffers from permanent retrograde amnesia as a result of 
which he has no recollection of any of the events alleged in the 
indictment”77—was conceded by the government at trial.  Thus, 
because malingering was not a concern, Wilson was an ideal test 
case for exploring the extent to which amnesia affects a criminal 
defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial. 
The court’s opinion was functional, restrained, and well-
considered.  The majority emphasized the importance of fairness in 
interpreting Dusky, embraced a case-by-case determination of 
amnesia’s effect on the right to a fair trial, and remanded the case 
with instructions to consider the issue again.78  The majority also 
ordered the lower court to make written findings based on six 
factors that explored the extent to which amnesia interfered with 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.79 
 
revelation of the facts within the knowledge of the defendant,” and that a 
defendant is prevented from fully assisting counsel if amnesic.  Id. at 978; see also 
State v. McClendon, 419 P.2d 69, 72 (Ariz. 1966). 
 72. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 73. Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 29. 
 74. 391 F.2d at 463. 
 75. Id. at 461. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 463-64. 
 79. Id.  The six factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to 
consult with and assist his lawyer. 
(2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to 
testify on his own behalf. 
(3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically 
reconstructed in view of the defendant’s amnesia.  Such evidence would 
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Although this decision has been praised in the academic 
literature for its restrained and sensible approach,80 it has not fared 
as well in the courts.  In fact, the Wilson multi-factor approach has 
almost never been followed.81  Instead, only a few other courts have 
taken amnesia claims seriously by considering how amnesia should 
affect the competency determination.82  And although a number of 
 
include evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably 
possible alibi. 
(4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his 
counsel in that reconstruction. 
(5) The strength of the prosecution’s case.  Most important here will be 
whether the Government’s case is such as to negate all reasonable 
hypotheses of innocence.  If there is any substantial possibility that the 
accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it 
should be presumed that he would have been able to do so. 
(6) Any other facts and circumstances which would indicate whether or 
not the defendant had a fair trial. 
Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Koson & Robey, supra note 45, at 591.  In a response following 
the article, L.C. Maguigad, M.D. noted that “[t]he courts should be guided by the 
precedence of this appeal decision: that it would not be fair to try a defendant if, 
because of genuine amnesia, he is substantially handicapped in his ability to 
effectively participate in his defense.”  Id. 
 81. See Miller, supra note 45, at 168-69 (finding that one appellate court’s 
conclusion that a majority of courts had adopted the Wilson court’s multifactor 
approach was “simply incorrect,” and that in fact, “[o]nly a few courts explicitly 
discussed the Wilson criteria” at all). 
 82. In addition to the dissent in Wilson, two opinions have considered 
amnesia a significant impediment to competency: the majority opinion in Fajeriak 
v. State, 520 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1974), and the dissent in Commonwealth ex rel. 
Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396 (1966).  In Fajeriak, the court held that “[t]he 
disruption of memory alleged to have been caused by the head injuries poses a 
more serious constitutional question, since partial amnesia would undeniably have 
impaired the appellant’s ability to assist in his defense.”  520 P.2d at 801.  In 
Cummins, although the majority opinion established that “amnesia is no defense at 
all” at trial, one judge dissented by arguing that “the constitutional right to 
counsel would be a sham” if, due to the defendant’s asserted amnesia, “defense 
counsel were not able to prepare a proper defense.”  421 Pa. at 407 (Cohen, J., 
dissenting).  The majority’s refusal in this case to grant a continuance to see if the 
defendant’s temporary amnesia abated “completely prevents the presentation of 
any defense which would dispel the conclusions arrived at from the 
circumstances.”  Id.  Finally, the dissent in Wilson also argued that 
[t]he above bases for my view on the due process issue bring the trial also 
into conflict with appellant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Appellant presumably is 
competent to observe and in one sense to understand at trial what is then 
taking place, but he is unable to understand its factual basis since he 
completely lacks all knowledge bearing on the testimony concerning his 
whereabouts, condition, and actions for the period of several hours 
preceding, during, and for weeks after the events being described at trial. 
16
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courts purport to consider amnesia when deciding a defendant’s 
competency to stand trial, very few courts have actually embraced 
the views in practice that amnesia significantly impairs the right of 
a defendant to consult with his attorney or have a fair trial.  As one 
scholar noted, “[d]espite [their] apparent concern for the 
propriety of putting a currently amnesic individual on trial, [there 
is] no appellate decision [where] amnesia, in and of itself, renders 
a defendant incompetent to stand trial.”83  Indeed, the position of 
virtually all state and federal courts in the American legal system is 
that “amnesia is not a bar to prosecution of an otherwise 
competent defendant.”84 
Instead, many courts follow the former approach—that 
amnesia is never grounds for determining an accused unfit to stand 
trial.  These courts have advanced a number of different rationales 
in support of this approach.  In the criminal prosecution context, 
most decisions appear to be “based on the notion that the 
circumscribed loss of memory, without an accompanying proof of 
its effect on the defense, is an insufficient basis for a ruling of 
incompetency.”85  United States military courts, for example, have 
been early and avid advocates of the position that amnesia does not 
render a criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial.86 
 
Thus, he cannot provide his counsel with information which might assist 
counsel in defending him. 
391 F.2d at 467 (Fahy, J., dissenting). 
 83. Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 29.  See also Case Note, supra note 34, 
at 188 (agreeing that no American or English court has found a defendant to be 
incompetent on the sole basis of amnesia); Miller, supra note 45, at 168-69, 179 n.9 
(citing cases from nearly every circuit and state holding that amnesia per se will not 
render defendant incompetent to stand trial). 
 84. United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1972); see also 
Parwatikar et al., supra note 4, at 102-03 (noting that even if the defendant is able 
to convince the court that amnesia is genuine, it may be “a Pyrrhic victory for the 
true [amnesic], unless such matters as automatic commitment to a state hospital 
and the dismissal of charges against the ‘permanently incompetent’ are resolved”). 
 85. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 37 
(1980) (citing Hansford v. U.S., 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and United States v. 
Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972 (D. Mo. 1964)). 
 86. Military courts have three basic reasons for supporting this “hard” 
approach: 
(1) suspicion that the defendant may be feigning amnesia; (2) a feeling 
(especially in cases of alleged alcoholic or hysterical amnesia) that the 
defendant has only himself to blame for his loss of memory; and (3) the 
judicial apprehension that to hold that amnesia protects the defendant 
from trial “would be tantamount to a holding that amnesia negated 
criminal responsibility as an original proposition.” 
17
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Outside of the military context, one of the major rationales is 
that the Dusky test requires “sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”87  
Therefore, “[a] competency evaluation should focus on the 
defendant’s present mental condition, with particular attention 
paid to his ability to understand the legal process and 
communicate with his attorney.”88  This rationale tends to 
emphasize the defendant’s ability to actually understand and to 
physically communicate during trial.  Thus, many courts have 
found that amnesia will rarely (if ever) be a bar to competency—
and indeed, may even be totally irrelevant to the competency 
determination: 
[W]hile amnesia may be relevant as a symptom evidencing 
a present infirmity in the defendant’s reasoning capacity, 
if the defendant has the present ability to understand the 
proceedings against him, to communicate with his lawyer 
and generally to conduct his defense in a rational 
manner, memory or the want thereof is irrelevant to the 
issue of competence.89 
This approach places the entire focus on a defendant’s present 
ability to consult with his lawyer, rather than placing the emphasis 
where it should be—on the defendant’s present ability to consult 
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.  But 
because so many courts interpret the Dusky “consult with counsel” 
requirement narrowly, they almost always find that criminal 
defendants are not rendered incompetent by amnesia. 
The same goes for the courts’ unsympathetic approach to the 
fairness argument.  Judges argue over and over again that amnesia 
as a mental disorder is just not disabling enough to render an 
otherwise competent defendant incompetent to stand trial—that it 
is simply not unfair to try a criminal defendant suffering from 
amnesia.  This judicial failure to find the trial of amnesic 
defendants unfair is deeply troubling to the academic and scientific 
communities; neither feels that courts take amnesia claims 
 
Case Note, supra note 34, at 188 (footnotes omitted). 
 87. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (emphasis added). 
 88. See Slobogin, supra note 37, at 81. 
 89. United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1071 (D. Del. 
1972) (citations omitted); see also Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 95 (“[A]t 
least one court has held that amnesia does not even entitle a defendant to an 
evaluation of competency.”) (citing Kirby v. Texas, 668 S.W. 2d 448 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984)). 
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seriously. 
It is true that American courts are generally reluctant to treat 
amnesia as seriously as other major mental problems such as 
depression and schizophrenia, to such an extent that many courts 
are dismissive90 or even flippant91 regarding amnesia claims.  For 
example, many courts (and some scholars92) rationalize trying 
allegedly amnesic defendants based on the idea that memory is 
simply ephemeral for everyone—that because every person forgets 
names, details, and places, everyone is amnesic to some degree.93  
 
 90. See Reagon v. State, 251 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ind. 1970).  The majority 
argued that 
[m]any times in a trial of a criminal case evidence is lost, a material 
witness dies, or, as in this case, the defendant has amnesia as to certain 
events or a time. Still, such handicaps from a defendant’s point of view 
cannot prevent a trial from taking place eventually. Rarely would we find 
a case in which a defendant could not contend that he was deprived of 
some evidence and therefore he ought not to be tried. 
Id. 
 91. See United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 n.3 (10th Cir. 1972) (joking 
that “[u]ndoubtedly there are instances in which defense counsel may wish that 
their clients would have amnesia. We do not suggest that this is such an 
occasion”). 
 92. Comment, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Particular Justice, 71 YALE 
L.J. 109, 136 (1961): 
Once it is recognized that amnesia is present to some degree in everyone 
and that its effects on the ability of an individual to assist in his own 
defense are often hard to distinguish from the disadvantages of many 
defendants to whom important facts are unavailable for reasons other 
than amnesia, it should be apparent that it is neither necessary nor 
appropriate to consider memory failure as a sufficient condition for the 
interruption of the adjudicatory process to minimize the danger of a 
miscarriage of justice. The special demands of extraordinary cases 
should, where possible, be met without losing sight of the fact that a 
generally effective system of criminal adjudication has been developed 
around rules of evidence and procedure calculated to insure a workable 
balance of the interests of the accused, the prosecution, and the court. 
 93. See Morrow v. Maryland, 443 A.2d 108, 113 (Md. 1982); see also United 
States ex rel. Parson, 354 F. Supp. at 1072: 
The [amnesic’s] plight is not unique. We know, for example, that the 
memory of any defendant “fades” to some degree. The innocent 
defendant who is arrested several months after the alleged crime and 
cannot recall where he was on the night in question is not in a dissimilar 
circumstance.  Moreover, we know that defendants may be deprived of 
direct knowledge of crucial events by circumstances other than loss of 
memory. “The plight of an [amnesic] differs very little from an accused 
who was home alone, asleep in bed at the time of the crime.”  Most 
importantly, we know that the defendant’s recollection is only one of 
many sources of evidence which may permit the reconstruction of a past 
event and that extrinsic evidence far more valuable to the defense than 
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This belief that amnesia is tantamount to simply having a bad 
memory is apparently a “widespread misconception” that “runs 
throughout court decisions.”94  But clinical researchers argue that 
amnesia is actually “a pathological inability of a particular 
selectivity, quality, and severity” that is too extensive to be 
explained by ordinary forgetfulness.  Thus, “the statement that ‘all 
people are amnesic to some extent’ is, by definition, incorrect.”95  
As one commenter noted, “[d]espite rationalizations from 
appellate courts comparing total amnesia to forgetfulness and 
other partial deficits in memory, there appears to be little question 
that in at least some cases amnesia may seriously interfere with a 
defendant’s ‘present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.’”96 
The point here is that amnesia is distinct from a simple 
inability to recall certain facts.  Genuine amnesia, as clinically 
defined, is different from normal forgetting in nature and in 
magnitude—it is removing someone as a “total personality” from 
the event in question, as if it never happened.97  Thus, the analogy 
to “normal forgetting” is misplaced.  By critical analogy, most 
courts would presumably never claim that clinical depression—
which, by itself, has been found to render defendants incompetent 
to stand trial98—is actually akin to “being very sad,” and thus 
“everyone is severely depressed to some degree.”  The notion of 
“depression” with reference to clinical depression, like the notion 
of “forgetting” with reference to amnesia, is simply of a different 
order and magnitude, and thus should not be marginalized or 
rationalized away. 
In addition to equating amnesia with the “normal forgetting” 
 
the defendant’s own testimony may be lost by reason of death, 
destruction or other fortuity prior to trial (footnotes omitted). 
The majority then quoted the passage cited in supra note 92. 
 94. Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 32. 
 95. Id. at 33. 
 96. See Miller, supra note 45, at 177. 
 97. See Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 98. See, e.g., Loyd v. Smith, 899 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing 
defendant as incompetent after his doctors “found that [his] depression rendered 
him unable to understand the charges and proceedings against him and that he 
could not effectively participate or assist in his defense”); Richard E. Redding & 
Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 353, 365 (2001) (noting that depression is one of the factors related, 
and potentially contributing, to findings of incompetency). 
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common to all witnesses and defendants, American courts have also 
repeatedly downplayed the amnesic’s plight by citing language 
analogizing amnesia to three supposedly similar situations where 
defendants are usually found fit to stand trial: losing key witnesses 
prior to trial,99 committing a crime while drunk,100 or being accused 
of a crime that occurred while one lay “asleep in bed.”101  However, 
all of these analogies are misplaced. 
The first situation—where an accused loses key witnesses prior 
to trial—is a problem of evidence or proof, rather than a problem 
of competency.  The accused loses important evidence when he 
loses witnesses, but his knowledge of the underlying facts remains 
the same—he still knows the important elements of the events in 
question, the motivations, the circumstances, the extenuating 
factors.  In contrast, the amnesic often has no memory whatsoever 
of the time surrounding the alleged criminal act—it is as if the 
event never happened (or at least not to him).102 
The second analogy is deficient as well, for the amnesic 
criminal defendant is distinguishable from a defendant committing 
a crime while drunk in at least three respects.  First, as long as the 
alcohol has not rendered the defendant completely amnesic, 
drunkenness affects responsibility for the crime, not the present 
 
 99. Comment, supra note 92, at 128. 
 100. These courts hold that for cases of alcoholic or substance-related amnesia, 
the amnesia is the defendant’s own fault and he should not avoid criminal 
adjudication for his own voluntary act.  See Wilson, 391 F.2d at 465 (Leventhal, J., 
concurring): 
I don’t see that he is significantly different from a defendant who was so 
intoxicated that he “passed out on his feet” at the crucial time, and does 
not now have the slightest recollection with which he can give his counsel 
any help as to what he was doing at that critical time. Whether a 
defendant’s lack of memory of what he did is due to the fact that he was 
too drunk at the time, or ran into a tree ten minutes later, I think he can 
rightly be held to account—and be asked to hold himself to account if he 
is a man of conscience—provided the evidence is clear on what he did. It 
is probably commonplace for a man to be convicted of negligent 
homicide although in fact his memory of the event is vitiated by drink, 
shock, or both, and I see nothing unconscionable in this. 
 101. Comment, supra note 92, at 128. 
 102. See Wilson, 391 F.2d at 468 (Fahy, J., dissenting) (“The faculty of memory 
for the pertinent period is destroyed.  This creates a different kind of disadvantage 
from an assumed difficulty in remembering.  It disables the accused in a manner 
which takes from him a quality essential to a total personality. It removes him, as a 
total personality, from not only the scene of the crimes but everywhere for the 
period preceding, during, and for three weeks after the crimes.”). 
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ability to consult with counsel or assist in his own defense.103  
Second, it is also unclear that the quality of “forgetting” is as 
complete with alcoholic forgetfulness as with permanent 
amnesia.104  But even if a defendant became completely amnesic 
through self-intoxication, the third and most important distinction 
is that the law already accounts for this contingency: it treats those 
who become voluntarily intoxicated with less sympathy because of 
the voluntary intoxication doctrine.105  Although criminal 
responsibility is not the subject of this Note,106 the voluntary 
intoxication doctrine holds that extreme intoxication does not 
excuse criminal liability (though it may negate specific intent), 
because of its foreseeable effects, including memory loss.107  The 
fact that “[a] reasonably foreseeable result of voluntary drinking is 
the lessening of ability to recall events” is justification enough for 
treating the drunken defendant differently from the amnesic 
one.108 
Finally, the third comparison occasionally used by courts to 
discount amnesia claims is inapt as well, since the plight of the 
amnesic accused is very different from that of the innocent accused 
lying asleep in bed during the crime.  The accused in the latter case 
has an alibi; he knows where he was when he went to sleep and 
when he awoke.  He also knows where he was most certainly was 
not: at the scene of the crime.  The amnesic, on the other hand, 
has no recollection of anything.  If the question of the likely guilt of 
the accused amnesic can temporarily be put to one side, a better 
analogy would be to try someone for a crime he did not commit, as 
a surrogate or “whipping boy” of the true guilty party.109  The 
 
 103. Id. at 467-68 (Fahy, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. (arguing that in contrast to the present case, the judge had never 
known a “case in which it has been held that drunkenness has erased all memory 
of the crime imputed to the person on trial”);  see also Comment, supra note 92 
(noting that many courts restrict the admissibility of willfully-induced, alcoholic 
amnesia). 
 105. See generally Chad J. Layton, Comment, No More Excuses: Closing The Door 
On The Voluntary Intoxication Defense, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (1997) (discussing 
and criticizing the defense of voluntary intoxication). 
 106. For further information on the relation of alcohol to both criminal 
responsibility and competency to stand trial, see id. 
 107. Wilson, 391 F.2d at 467-68 (Fahy, J., dissenting) (“A separate body of law 
has developed on the effect of drunkenness on responsibility for crime.  For 
example, where specific intent is an ingredient of the offense, drunkenness is 
material, and so too where premeditation is an ingredient.”). 
 108. See Wilson, 391 F.2d at 468 (Fahy, J., dissenting). 
 109. See id. at 466 (Fahy, J., dissenting): 
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surrogate in this analogy would have the present ability to assist 
with his counsel by formulating possible motives, brainstorming 
extenuating factors, and making decisions about whether to plead 
guilty or innocent, depending upon the amount of evidence 
arrayed against him.  But the surrogate, like the amnesic, would be 
no more help than that of a lay assistant to counsel—a paralegal 
poised for punishment. 
This is not to say that guilt is irrelevant to the competency 
determination, practically speaking.  In fact, courts often seem to 
treat the likely guilt of the defendant as the most meaningful 
consideration when confronted with defendants who claim 
amnesia.  But a consistent and principled administration of the 
right to a fair trial should include a meaningful chance for criminal 
defendants to show why they cannot effectively assist in their own 
defense, lest the Constitutional promise to only try competent 
defendants becomes an empty one. 
VI.   AMNESIA AND JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM 
Whether amnesia should prove a bar to competency is a close 
question with strong arguments on both sides.  As noted, this 
question has been discussed at length in the literature, and many 
courts have considered amnesia relevant (though ultimately, 
insufficient) in their competency determinations.  Still, the dearth 
of cases that have actually found amnesia a dispositive factor is 
quite surprising in light of its relatively extensive treatment in cases 
and commentaries.  The lack of cases is also surprising because the 
amnesia question raises other, larger questions, such as: how 
competent is “competent enough,” and how fair must a “fair trial” 
be?  Is a defendant’s likely guilt a factor in determining 
competency—or should it be?  And how far should courts go to 
ensure that all defendants can consult with counsel and assist in 
 
Appellant by reason of physical brain injury has not simply been 
completely and permanently deprived of all knowledge of the robbery 
itself but of all knowledge of anything covering the entire period 
surrounding it. To try him for crimes which occurred during this period 
is thus to try him for something about which he is mentally absent 
altogether, and this for a cause not attributable to his voluntary conduct. 
The effect is very much as though he were tried in absentia notwithstanding his 
physical presence at the time of trial. (emphasis added). 
Accord Miller, supra note 45, at 177 (comparing amnesic criminal defendant in this 
case to the “defendant in Kafka’s The Trial—helpless to deal with what is 
happening to him in situations affecting his liberty and even his life”). 
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their own defense? 
The reason that amnesia is never found a bar to competency 
may be that, although the theoretical question is a close one, the 
pragmatic reasons for discounting amnesia claims tip the scales.  
Indeed, the two most frequently expressed judicial fears regarding 
amnesia are both practical: one is the discomfort with the 
consequences of holding amnesics incompetent, and the other is 
the perceived threat posed by malingering defendants. 
Each of these concerns will be discussed below, but first it is 
important to note that this preoccupation with practical concerns 
calls into question the existence of a sound and consistent 
theoretical treatment of amnesic defendants by the American 
judicial system.  Simply put, courts would not be so concerned with 
practical considerations if amnesia were unrelated to competency, 
or if amnesia were, at most, a small factor in the competency 
determination.  But courts do dwell extensively on practical 
rationales for discounting amnesia claims, suggesting that the 
judiciary is not entirely comfortable—and is, in fact, struggling—
with the doctrinal bases of competency in amnesia cases.  This 
inquiry is particularly important, for if the theoretical arguments 
are flawed, and defendants are being found competent to stand 
trial simply due to the practical problems that amnesics pose, then 
a better way to deal with these pragmatic concerns (such as a better 
method of telling real from feigned amnesics) should lead to a 
more principled—and arguably more receptive—treatment of 
amnesics in American courts. 
The first major practical rationale advanced by courts is that 
they fear to hold defendants incompetent to stand trial because of 
amnesia “in part due to the consequences of finding such a 
defendant incompetent.”110  Because Jackson v. Indiana111 prohibits 
holding an incompetent defendant indefinitely without trial, “[i]f 
the amnesia is permanent, a finding of incompetency would be 
tantamount to a dismissal of charges.”112  This has resulted in a 
“fear that amnesia might provide a ‘ready-made’ defense to all 
criminals.”113 
 
 110. Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 92; see also id. at 96 (“[S]ome courts 
have been concerned that, at least in cases of permanent amnesia, a finding of 
competency would allow a defendant to avoid prosecution.”). 
 111. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 112. Roesch & Golding,  supra note 5, at 92. 
 113. Bradford & Smith, supra note 26, at 230.  This concern was made explicit 
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This judicial fear is misplaced: that same concern applies to 
any mental condition or defect that would lead to a finding of 
incompetency, yet courts have been (selectively) vigilant in refusing 
to prosecute criminal defendants with other severe mental 
problems such as schizophrenia.114  Further, competency has 
traditionally (and sensibly) been determined without regard to the 
possible obstacle it poses to securing a guilty verdict.115 
In addition, the courts most receptive to amnesia claims have, 
on fairness and smooth adjudication grounds alone, temporarily 
stayed criminal proceedings in the hopes that the alleged amnesic 
would eventually recover some of his memory.116  Often, if the 
defendant continues to claims amnesia after a stay, the trial will 
resume anyway.  But if these courts can concede that it might be 
unfair to try a defendant who is currently claiming amnesia, surely 
there is no principled explanation for how it somehow becomes 
fair, after a stay without improvement in his condition, to try him 
anyway?  In fact, there is no principled distinction between trying 
temporarily and permanently amnesic defendants, and “appellate 
decisions, which clearly distinguish between temporary and permanent 
amnesia, seem to be made on the practical basis that an 
adjudication of a permanently amnesic defendant as incompetent 
precludes forever the possibility of his returning to trial.”117  In 
other words, the practical rationale appears to be that courts can 
eventually obtain a guilty verdict against the temporary, but not the 
 
in Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, where the court stated that 
[i]f in fact the condition of amnesia is permanent, defendant’s 
contention (1) would require Courts to hold that such amnesia will 
permanently, completely and absolutely negate all criminal responsibility 
and (2) will turn over the determination of crime and criminal liability to 
psychiatrists, whose opinions are usually based in large part upon 
defendant’s self-serving statements, instead of to Courts and juries, and 
(3) will greatly jeopardize the safety and security of law-abiding citizens 
and render the protection of Society from crime and criminals far more 
difficult than ever before in modern history . . . .  Unless an accused is 
legally insane, the law is not and should not be so unrealistic and foolish 
as to permanently free, without acquittal by a Judge or a jury, a person against 
whom a prima facie case of murder is made out. 
218 A.2d 758, 763 (Pa. 1966). 
 114. For example, although the defendant in Jackson was a “mentally defective 
deaf mute,” the holding has been construed to apply to all cases where a 
defendant is incompetent to stand trial.  406 U.S. at 717. 
 115. Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J., 
dissenting). 
 116. See State v. McClendon, 437 P.2d 421, 423 (Ariz. 1966). 
 117. Koson & Robey, supra note 45, at 588. 
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permanent amnesic. 
Thus, a fear of the consequences of holding amnesics 
incompetent has in some cases trumped the consistent and 
principled application of the competency standards.  Perhaps the 
theoretical emphasis in the judicial hostility towards amnesia claims 
has less to do with a belief that amnesia has little bearing on 
competency, but rather that courts are uncomfortable with 
competency jurisprudence.  Many courts insist (somewhat 
unconvincingly), that pragmatic concerns are not trumping 
constitutional rights; but this insistence is further belied by their 
even deeper preoccupation with the problems posed by 
malingering. 
VII.    THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF MALINGERED AMNESIA 
Of seemingly greater concern to the courts than the problem 
of the practical consequences of holding amnesics incompetent is 
the special problem of malingering.  As noted, over the repeated 
protests of researchers and scholars, the court system has time and 
time again found that amnesia is no bar to competency—that even 
when coupled with other mental disorders, a finding of 
competency, in spite of amnesia claims, is virtually assured.118  Yet at 
the same time, courts have often expressed concern over whether 
defendants are telling the truth about their amnesia, or whether 
they are malingering.119 
Before discussing this disconnect, it is first important to note 
the scope of the problem, and to see that the legal preoccupation 
with malingering, though inconsistent and perhaps not 
theoretically sound, is not absurd.  Courts are understandably 
cautious with alleged amnesia due to “the high rate of such claims, 
particularly in major crimes, and the perceived ease of 
malingering.”120  Courts have consistently pointed to the supposed 
 
 118. See infra Part V. 
 119. See, e.g., Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 93 (“[C]ourts . . . view a 
defendant’s claim of amnesia with great suspicion.”). 
 120. Miller, supra note 45, at 169 (footnotes omitted); see also Parwatikar et al., 
supra note 4, at 97 (referring to “the concern that many defendants would escape 
punishment or being brought to trial by malingering amnesia, which is easy to do 
and hard to detect”);  Stephen Porter et al., Memory for Murder: A Psychological 
Perspective on Dissociative Amnesia in Legal Contexts, 24 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 23, 25-
26 (2001) (arguing that although some courts have found amnesia relevant to 
competency to stand trial, “courts more often have disregarded amnesia reports in 
defendants, apparently because of concern over the potential for malingering”); 
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ease and likelihood of feigning amnesia as justification for finding 
allegedly amnesic defendants competent to stand trial, based on an 
apparently widespread perception among courts, and a few 
commentators, of the “extreme difficulty—often impossibility—of 
distinguishing real from feigned amnesia.”121  For example, the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that “[t]he potential for fraudulent 
allegations of memory loss is so great that we would for this reason 
alone be reluctant to follow [sic] amnesia as a ground for a finding 
of incompetency even if we were otherwise inclined to do so.”122  
Exacerbating this problem is the fact that most of the expert 
testimony in courts is little more than educated guesses by 
psychological experts untrained in the finer points of memory 
loss.123 
Thus, the judicial reluctance to regard amnesia as a bar to 
competency can best be explained by the probability that many 
amnesia cases are feigned, and by the accompanying perceived 
 
Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 32 (“[C]aution on the part of the judiciary 
appears, at least in part, to be grounded in skepticism concerning the genuineness 
of claims of amnesia.  It may also result from incomplete and, in some cases, 
incorrect knowledge about what amnesia is and what it is not.”). 
 121. Comment, supra note 92, at 123.  The author continues: 
[A]n attempt to verify all but the most patently phony claims of amnesia 
is at best a difficult and time-consuming task; at worst it is a hopeless one.  
This fact is of paramount importance to the development of appropriate 
judicial responses to allegations of amnesia, for, as long as it remains 
true, devices developed to neutralize the presumed disadvantages of 
amnesic defendants will be equally available to all but the more inept 
malingerers. 
Id. at 124-25 (footnotes omitted); see also Rubinsky & Brandt, supra note 11, at 42 
(arguing that part of the reluctance of courts to believe amnesia claims may be 
based on the lack of reliable procedures for discriminating between real and 
malingered amnesia); McClendon, 437 P.2d at 424 (“The concern of the courts in 
this area is the very real danger that amnesia can be feigned easily and that 
discovery and proof of feigning and malingering is difficult, especially when the 
defendant refuses to take the stand.”). 
 122. Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802 (Alaska 1974); see also State v. Pugh, 
283 A.2d 537, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); McClendon, 437 P.2d at 425. 
 123. As Cima et al. point out, 
[f]or the expert witness, it is very difficult to differentiate between 
dissociative, organic or feigned amnesia on the basis of interviews with 
the defendant.  This has to do with the fact that simulators can give a 
compelling imitation of someone with a dissociative or organic 
amnesia . . . . Nevertheless, our impression is that mental health 
professionals acting as experts in cases of amnesia often use interviews 
with the defendant as the sole source for making their diagnostic 
judgments. 
Cima et al.,  supra note 3, at 27. 
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inability to distinguish the real cases from the fake.  But once again, 
the malingering question is only relevant in a system where 
amnesia plays a vital role in adjudicating competency.  If amnesia is 
theoretically irrelevant, or is relegated to simply one of so many 
factors that courts may examine to determine competency, why is 
there such a great emphasis on the question of whether a 
defendant is feigning his claim? 
The likely answer, as previously suggested, is that the practical 
problem of detecting real from feigned amnesia is an important 
obstacle to solving the theoretical problem posed by amnesia’s 
relevance to the competency determination.  Thus, better 
malingering-detecting tests would seemingly solve this problem, 
and hopefully convince courts to reconsider the theoretical bases 
of their amnesia approaches and their competency jurisprudence 
generally.124  Besides the small minority of courts that will never 
find amnesia relevant to competency, a better technique to 
distinguish between real and malingered amnesia would allow 
amnesia to play a more prominent role in competency 
determinations125: “If a method to detect malingered amnesia was 
developed, the legal policy concerning it could be changed to 
benefit those with true amnesia.”126 
VIII.    NEW TECHNIQUES TO DETECT MALINGERED AMNESIA CLAIMS 
Do any such techniques to detecting real from malingered 
amnesia cases exist?  The answer depends in part on the likely 
origin of the claimed amnesia.  Organic amnesia, a symptom of 
traumatic brain injury that prevents the patient from recalling only 
events immediately preceding or following an injury, tends to 
follow a fairly predictable course of injury and memory recovery 
known as Ribot’s Law.127  For this reason, “[u]nlike dissociative 
amnesia, organic amnesia is a relatively unproblematic 
phenomenon,” in part because it “is considerably more difficult to 
simulate, at least for lay persons, precisely because it has such a 
typical course.”128  Furthermore, when defendants have actual brain 
 
 124. See Comment, supra note 50, at 342. 
 125. See Parwatikar et al., supra note 4, at 102. 
 126. Id. at 97. 
 127. Id. at 29. 
 128. Id.  On a related note, the presence of Ribot’s Law could hypothetically 
provide useful evidence of a crime, as the researchers explain: 
If the defendant’s amnesia follows Ribot’s law, that information might be 
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trauma, or where other physical evidence exists, courts consider the 
amnesia as more plausible, and thus the consideration of amnesia 
in the competency context is less controversial.129  For example, in 
Wilson v. United States, the defendant’s car accident and subsequent 
three-week coma following his bank robbery spurred the 
prosecution’s decision to concede his amnesia for the crime.130  
Other cases follow the familiar pattern where one person kills 
another before turning the gun on himself or herself, yet somehow 
manages to survive.131  In these cases, the defendant is often 
functionally lobotomized, and because one of the common 
resultant brain symptoms of such accidents is amnesia, the 
defendant’s amnesia is rarely disputed.  Finally, in organic cases 
involving extreme intoxication, the claimed amnesia may be 
conceded by the prosecution based on extreme blood alcohol or 
toxicology tests.  As noted above though, the problems raised in 
such cases are generally dealt with under the voluntary intoxication 
doctrine.132 
Cases of dissociative amnesia, on the other hand, are relatively 
more rare, much harder to detect, and are thus presumed to be 
more fraught with the danger of malingering.133  One group of 
researchers showed that “lay persons as well as many expert 
witnesses tend to view dissociative amnesia as the rule and feigned 
amnesia as the exception . . . [but the researchers thought] it 
would be wise to reverse these probability estimates.”134  
Compounding the problem is the fact that legal scholars have 
confidently asserted the impossibility of detecting real from 
malingered amnesia for decades.135 
Yet there is hope among the legal and scientific communities, 
as new methods of assessing and testing real versus malingered 
 
crucial for the defendant’s counsel.  Consider the example of the 
defendant charged with murder.  If the defendant has organic amnesia 
and it can be shown that this amnesia originates from the victim hitting 
the defendant on the head before he was murdered, then a self-defense 
interpretation of the murder might be considered. 
Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 391 F.2d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 131. See, e.g., State v. McLendon, 437 P.2d 421, 422 (Ariz. 1968). 
 132. See Cima et al., supra note 3, at 28. 
 133. See id. at 27-28 (discussing three reasons to consider claims of dissociative 
amnesia critically). 
 134. Id. at 27. 
 135. Comment, supra note 92, at 123. 
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amnesia have been recently introduced.136  Traditional 
psychological interviews with patients were generally unhelpful and 
unproductive, since the interviewee could claim to have no 
memory of the events he was being questioned about.137  Thus, 
according to researchers, “[i]t is only on the basis of psychological 
tests and tasks, that an expert will be able to identify simulators.”138  
Several of these new techniques have proven useful in 
distinguishing real from feigned cases of amnesia,139 such that, 
“experts who at the request of the court have to evaluate a case in 
which crime-related amnesia is claimed can and should do more 
than just interview the defendant.”140 
Some of the more promising techniques fall into two broad 
groups.  The first group contains relatively new techniques of 
reviving “lost” or inaccessible memories by means other than 
through simple psychotherapy, such as through the use of 
hypnotism, sodium amytal (“truth serum”), or state-dependant 
recall.  These studies serve the dual purpose of detecting 
malingering141 while at the same time attempting to revive memory 
in amnesics.142 
The second and more promising group is composed of a series 
of psychological self-report tests that have recently made great 
strides in detecting malingering in clinical settings, and 
occasionally in forensic settings as well.  Two techniques deserve 
specific mention.143  The first is “Symptom Validity Testing” (SVT), 
where “the defendant is asked a series of dichotomous (true-false) 
questions about the crime and the circumstances under which it 
took place.”144  With purely random guessing, the defendant’s 
answers should be correct about 50% of the time, thus, 
“[i]ndividuals who perform significantly below chance avoid 
correct alternatives, which means that they have knowledge about 
the correct answers, and [implying] that they are feigning memory 
 
 136. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 45, at 169-72. 
 137. Cima et al., supra note 3, at 27. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 29-32. 
 140. Id. at 31. 
 141. See Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 94 (recognizing that the 
effectiveness of some of these methods may rest in part on the belief of the 
defendant that the methods will discover the truth). 
 142. For an overview of these studies, see Miller, supra note 45, at 172-76. 
 143. See Cima et al., supra note 3, at 29-32. 
 144. Id. at 29-30. 
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impairment.”145  The researchers describe several studies in which 
suspected or confirmed malingerers in forensic settings showed a 
response score significantly below chance.146 
The other promising method for forensic evaluators to detect 
malingering “is provided by self-report questionnaires that 
capitalize on the tendency of malingerers to exaggerate their 
memory complaints.”147  Specifically, the researchers describe the 
“Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology” (SIMS) 
questionnaire, which consists of a series of self-report questions 
where defendants are asked to answer questions about the way they 
experience amnesia, under the theory “that malingerers will 
exaggerate and so will endorse bizarre, unrealistic, and atypical 
symptoms.”148  Like the SVT, studies with SIMS found excellent 
results, identifying 90% or more of the malingerers correctly, with 
similarly promising results in forensic settings.149 
IX.  A BETTER WAY TO APPROACH THE AMNESIA PROBLEM 
If courts continue to insist that amnesia is largely irrelevant or 
at best of only modest importance in the competency 
determination based on their strict reading of the Dusky precedent, 
there is little hope of any change in their approach to amnesia.  
But if courts are serious about conducting fair trials and trying only 
competent defendants, they should reconsider their competency 
jurisprudence.  Because some of the practical concerns with 
amnesia have been reduced (as better techniques for detecting real 
from malingered amnesia have been developed), or are not as 
grave as was once thought (as in the case of the practical 
consequences of finding amnesics fit to stand trial), courts have the 
option of pursuing better solutions to the problems posed by the 
amnesic criminal defendant. 
Some sound solutions have already been proposed in case law 
and scholarly texts.  As noted previously, several researchers have 
argued that the functional, case-by-case approach is best.150  Rather 
 
 145. Id. at 30. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Roesch & Golding, supra note 5, at 96 (describing the Wilson case and 
others as employing “the kind of functional, case by case assessment which we have 
proposed be used in all determinations of competency”); see also Patricia A. Zapf & 
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than trying to determine competence by the Dusky test or some 
other arbitrary framework, they argue, courts should individually 
assess the disability posed by the amnesia for each defendant in 
every trial, based on factors such as the degree to which guilt is in 
question, and how much the memory deficiency interferes with 
putting on an effective defense.151  Although advocated by many 
scholars, this approach was used most famously by the court in 
Wilson v. United States.152 
However, the functional approach is not without 
shortcomings.  The concurring judge in Wilson described the “nub” 
of the majority’s opinion as, “at least in a case of admitted amnesia 
due to brain damage, not subject to abuse as feigned, it is requisite 
for the court as well as the jury to make a fact finding that there is 
no reasonable doubt of guilt.”153  However, the goal of the 
competency determination is not to only try incompetent 
defendants who are definitely guilty, but rather to only try competent 
defendants.  As the dissenting judge responded in Wilson, 
I assume as does the court that the evidence at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the conviction. This is often true 
notwithstanding a conviction [sic] cannot stand because 
obtained in violation of due process of law, the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, or for some other 
error . . . . Determination of guilt is not the test of the 
validity of a criminal conviction under our system of law. 
Though such a determination is essential, it must be 
reached at a trial which conforms to the requirements of 
the Bill of Rights. Ascertainment of guilt even to a 
scientific or mathematical certainty does not alone 
suffice.154 
A better method would be to modify the Wilson approach, by 
discarding Wilson’s reliance on purely functional factors such as the 
relative determinacy of an individual’s guilt.  Instead, the focus 
should be on the conceptual underpinnings of the competency 
determination.  A court should ask: to what extent could the 
 
Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, 37 
CT. REV. 28, 31-34 (2000). 
 151. See Roesch & Golding,  supra note 5, at 95-96. 
 152. 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 153. Id. at 465-66 (Leventhal, J., concurring);  see also United States v. Sullivan, 
406 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1969) (implying that a court’s treatment of the amnesic 
defendant will turn, in part, on the sufficiency of evidence presented). 
 154. 391 F.2d at 466-67 (Fahy, J., dissenting). 
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claimed amnesia impair the defendant’s ability to assist with 
counsel, and ultimately, to have a fair trial, in those rare situations 
where amnesia can be reliably established or is conceded by the 
prosecution?  Thus, in situations with evidence of a pre-mediated 
or ongoing crime, an apparent or stated motive, eyewitnesses or an 
accomplice, or with only partial or patchy amnesia for the alleged 
event, amnesia would presumably pose less of a threat to 
competency.  In contrast, cases with factors such as an unclear 
series of events, brain trauma leading to organic amnesia, 
prolonged periods of amnesia including total amnesia for the 
event, a reliance on circumstantial evidence, and crimes without 
discernible motives, amnesia would pose a greater obstacle to 
competency and, at the very least, mandate a continuance of trial 
until memory is recovered.  In cases where memory is 
irrecoverable, rather than try an incompetent defendant, a federal 
court should follow the command of Jackson and hold the prisoner 
for treatment—and, if necessary, eventually free him.  This 
approach, though imperfect, is preferable because it is limited in 
scope, theoretically consistent with ensuring a fair trial, and 
realistic enough in its approach to ensure that only genuinely 
competent defendants will face justice in court. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the relationship between malingering, amnesia, 
and competency to stand trial suggests three things to a court faced 
with an allegedly amnesic criminal defendant.  First, courts should 
continue to treat amnesia claims skeptically, but should not 
discount them altogether.  Clearly, although many—perhaps 
most—claimed cases of amnesia are not genuine, new and more 
reliable research techniques, with the aid of expert witness 
testimony, can help distinguish the minority of true from the 
malingered claims.  Just as experts “can and should do more than 
just interview the defendant,”155 courts should likewise be better 
prepared to understand the new techniques that are available.  
They should also attempt to distinguish those experts who rely on 
conjecture and interviews from those who employ and have 
expertise in the better differentiation methods. 
Second, with better techniques of detecting malingerers, the 
 
 155. See Cime et al., supra note 3, at 31. 
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scarcity of genuine amnesia claims will pose less of a practical 
problem for courts.  Thus, those cases of amnesia that are found to 
be genuine and relevant to competency should be met with an 
appropriately refined judicial response.  At the very least, in cases 
where the existence of amnesia is conceded or where competent 
experts testify to the probable existence of genuine amnesia, the 
court should follow the lead of Wilson and attempt to determine 
amnesia’s relevancy to the fitness to stand trial determination.  This 
may include granting a remand or a continuance in appropriate 
cases to see whether the amnesia is temporary or permanent.  
Additional trial fairness safeguards, such as the mandated 
prosecutorial sharing of all relevant evidence with defendants, 
should also become more prevalent. 
Third, in order to fully effectuate the right of a defendant to a 
fair trial, a court should not so stringently apply the Dusky standard 
that its interpretation becomes illusory or empty.  For the 
competency determination to mean anything, the defendant’s 
ability to consult with counsel should include as a factor the ability 
to remember at least some portion of the events surrounding and 
during the alleged crime.  What is important is not exactly how 
much is remembered, but rather the effect the supposed lack of 
memory has on the ability of the defendant to assist with counsel 
and receive a fair trial.  In order to see whether the amnesia is 
temporary or whether memories can be recovered, courts should 
consider psychiatric institutionalization and a trial continuance 
while the prisoner is treated and interviewed, possibly including 
hypnosis or sodium amytal interviews.  If, under Jackson, the 
defendant cannot be made competent to stand trial within a 
prescribed period of time, fairness and a profound regard for 
constitutional rights mandates treatment, and if necessary, his 
eventual release. 
This Note does not propose that defendants with amnesia be 
given a free ride or a “get out of jail free” card.  Nor does it attempt 
to minimize the real practical difficulties in determining genuine 
from malingered cases of amnesia, or downplay the terrible 
dilemma in ultimately freeing defendants whose guilt is 
unquestioned or virtually so.  Rather, it advocates a more 
principled approach by courts towards defendants who claim 
amnesia.  This approach is based on new and better techniques for 
detecting malingered amnesia, and an examination of competency 
that focuses on the essential purposes of the competency 
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determination, rather than an overly-narrow construction of the 
Dusky test.  Although problems exist, pragmatism should not stand 
in the way of the zealous defense of prisoner liberties, nor should 
easy solutions come at the expense of unfair trials.  An amnesic 
criminal defendant may not be entitled to a perfect trial, but as 
various courts have affirmed, they are at least entitled to a fair 
one—and that is why fairness should be the test. 
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